The penetration of state and business structures by criminal networks

There is a widely held perception within intellectual circles in Mozambique that the state is a gangster state. This has come to the fore in television debates, newspaper editorials, readers' letters, and at the universities.

Mia Couto, a well-known Mozambican writer, said recently in an interview that 'Mozambique is becoming an impracticable country. We live in a kingdom where those who lead are the criminals'. The year 2000, Couto said, 'was a year of prosperity for the gangsters'.³⁴ This was an obvious reference to organised crime.

Making an assessment of the year 2000, a well-known economist, António Souto, wrote at the beginning of 2001 that 'The attorney general, the courts and in general the judicial institutions continue to be guided by lack of efficiency and, to a large extent, [are] manipulated by the Mafia'.³⁵ Although these views emanate from only two individuals, they represent a more widely-held notion that the state is connected to crime.

One of the reasons for these views is the apparent ease with which organised criminal networks have managed to infiltrate both state and business structures. Some of the examples have been outlined above. The disappearance of 14 million US dollars from the Commercial Bank of Mozambique and the state's response to this is a typical example of criminal networks (in this case also involving state officials) having penetrated a business structure. Another example is the wide network of traders who participate in the buying and selling of smuggled goods.

The structures, characteristics and general operation of the criminal networks, and the impact of their activities, have been described above. What follows relates to:

• their modus operandi in penetrating state and private sector structures;
• the impact of such penetration on the government structures and on the ability of those structures to supply an effective service to the citizens; and
• the impact on legitimate commerce and trade within the country and on international trade, in particular with the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
   

Modus operandi

Organised criminal groups generally use three methods to penetrate structures of the state and the private sector:

• bribery and corruption,
• the utilisation of influence through political patronage, and
• intimidation or coercion.

Their task is not very difficult when one bears in mind that during 2001 the minimum salary of state employees in Mozambique was about 700 000 Meticals a month - about 40 US dollars. The salary of a police officer who investigates organised crime is less than 4 million Meticals a month - approximately 180 US dollars. Senior prosecutors at provincial level earn salaries of about 8 million Metical, or approximately 360 US dollars, a month.³⁶ Very high unemployment rates also mean that jobs are precious, particularly in the state sector where a degree of job security is assured.

Bribery and corruption

Criminals spend thousand of dollars in bribing state officials and individuals in the private sector. Members of the Satar family, referred to above, are suspected of having bribed prosecutors, judges and senior police officers to pre-empt and neutralise the investigation into their alleged involvement in the loss of 14 million US dollars by the Commercial Bank of Mozambique. They are today accused of spending about 2 million US dollars on such bribes. No thorough or effective investigation into their conduct has taken place. Details of their alleged role in the disappearance of the 14 million dollars from the bank have not come to light and it is therefore not possible to say whether, and to what extent, the bribing of bank officials and others played a role in that case.

The fact that some prosecutors and police officers, whose state salaries are low, publicly display their luxury vehicles and other expensive possessions, inevitably arouses the suspicion of corruption.

The criminal groups involved in drug trafficking utilise the same procedures in their penetration of state structures. They rely on the 'purchase of impunity' through bribery and corruption in order to operate without too much state interference. They cultivate connections at the highest levels of the state hierarchy or of the ruling Frelimo party and seek their protection in exchange for money. Buying impunity might also require the bribing of customs officers to facilitate the importation and exportation of drugs, of immigration officers to buy DIREs (identification cards of foreign citizens) to facilitate the movement of their foreign collaborators, and of police members to ensure that they do not take steps when receiving reports of illegal activities or in order to get them to act supportively.

Reliance on political influence

The cultivation and use of links with top political figures often results from the 'buying' of influence. Senior political figures, mainly those whose political authority is derived from their participation in the war of liberation in Mozambique, use their influential positions to intimidate state officials who would be in a position to act against corruption and organised crime.

There is a perception among some in Mozambique that the state mainly serves a minority of political supporters who benefit from its resources. The expansion of the so-called 'national bourgeoisie' in Mozambique is being helped along through the accumulation of capital often derived from commissions that supporters of political parties and their relatives receive as a result of having cultivated influence, often through corruption.

Mozambique could not have become an international transit centre for narcotics without widespread collusion between organised criminal groups and state officials. The international Mavalane airport in Maputo is regarded as a relatively 'open' and low-risk exit and entry point for drug smugglers or couriers. This all contributes to Mozambique being considered an important international transit country for drugs. The large-scale re-routing of drugs such as hashish, cocaine or mandrax to countries in Europe and East Asia or to South Africa requires low-risk storage facilities. As with any other business, the traffickers need to build up stocks from which to supply their markets in southern Africa and, more importantly, abroad. The policing of such storage facilities is a problem, even in countries with adequate resources and large police agencies. The size of Mozambique, its long coastline and land borders, and its underfunded police force, all contribute to making this task even more difficult.

Intimidation and coercion

This is a method used by criminal groups with links to politicians and senior state officials involved in organised crime. The case of the illicit importation of liquor, facilitated by the son of a top politician (referred to above) serves as an example. When this person expects any obstacles in the process of clearing his illicitly imported goods, he allegedly uses his position as the son of a well-known politician to intimidate and influence customs officials. In the circumstances in which Mozambique finds itself, it is perhaps understandable that state officials will be reluctant to prevent a person with such connections from proceeding with his illegal activities for fear of possible reprisals.
 

The impact of such penetration on government structures and their ability to supply an effective service

It is to be expected that the penetration by organised crime of governmental structures erodes the trust that citizens have placed in them. Where this phenomenon becomes part of the public discourse, an impression soon develops that the state does not have the political will to fight crime.

Because of the undermining networks it creates, the penetration of state structures by organised criminal groups limits the state's ability and scope to take effective action. It also directly compromises the transparency of government and of the structures affected. For example, the Mozambican minister responsible for customs and excise may have laudable intentions when promoting the reform of customs policies and procedures in order to increase state revenue so that more money can be spent on activities and projects aimed at alleviating poverty or advancing education. However, if the son of a senior politician is involved in the illicit importation of goods, it becomes very difficult to take action for fear of the consequences.

Transparency and trust are also compromised when the state appears to have double standards. The failure by the state to publish information relating to the involvement of well-connected figures in criminal activities clearly sends the signal that it is protecting such persons or the public figures with whom they have connections.

Criminal penetration also has a significant impact on the administration of justice. The criminal justice system is seen to be subservient to powerful organised criminal groups, thereby seriously undermining its public credibility. Once again, the activities of the Satar brothers can serve as an example. They allegedly not only interfered with the investigation of the case involving the loss of 14 million US dollars from the Commercial Bank of Mozambique, but also managed to influence police investigators when they faced other allegations of unlawful conduct. They were accused of having used the funds allegedly obtained from the Commercial Bank of Mozambique to lend money at usurious rates. Traders in financial difficulties allegedly borrowed money from them because the banks declined to advance funds to them. The Satars would then impose high interest rates and very short repayment periods. Some traders, such as the Central Market Group of Maputo, incurred heavy debts with the Satars. When collecting their debts, the Satars appear to have been able also to rely on the human and material resources of the state. In this way they were allegedly placed in a position from which they were able to influence orders of imprisonment for their debtors or their release from imprisonment.³⁷ The police and prison officials involved allegedly acted in a compliant manner and did not always abide by the law.

After Carlos Cardoso was assassinated in 2001, one of the suspects who was arrested implicated the Satar brothers. The police involved in the case then allegedly released or removed this suspect, causing the investigation to change its focus. It was only at this stage, when the public became aware that the investigation appeared to be strongly influenced by the Satar brothers, that the police who were probing Cardoso's murder were dismissed from the case. The penetration of the Satar brothers into police circles contributed to the failure by the police to undertake their task in a professional and impartial manner. Such conduct, which is the subject of public discussion in Mozambique, inevitably creates the perception that any citizen who has a conflict or fallout with the Satars does not enjoy the protection of the state or the law. In such circumstances the state is seen to be ignoring the law and serving the interests of the Satars instead of acting in the public interest.

A few year ago a judge ordered the release of ten citizens of Asian origin who were implicated in the trafficking of drugs after they had been found in a mandrax factory in Maputo. They were released under conditions which the judge did not disclose to the Supreme Court or to the Juridical Magistrate. The suspects immediately escaped from Mozambique, resulting in the closure of the case against them. The judge who released them was subsequently dismissed in May 1996.

The inability of the criminal justice system to deliver effective justice has on occasion led to tension between the police and the judiciary. Members of the police maintain that arrested criminals are often released the following day and they blame the prosecutors and judges for this, accusing the courts of releasing important suspects. The judges, in turn, respond with accusations that police investigations are poor and that insufficient evidence is placed before them to justify convictions or detention in prison. It appears that growing frustration within some police circles has led to the formation of unofficial groups that kill suspects while, it is alleged, they were resisting arrest or trying to escape. This form of organised criminality emanates from within state structures and is not a result of criminal penetration. Sources claim the existence of at least one such group,³⁸ composed of police members but operating without the authority or mandate of police management. It pursues its own agenda, eliminating important criminals who are thought to have the means to escape the judicial process.
 

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