Disruption and negotiation in Parliament

During President Joaquim Chissano's state of the nation speech to parliament in December and several times in the early days of the session in February, Renamo-UE MPs banged on desks and used kazoos and other musical instruments to make so much noise that the speaker could not be heard.

The interruptions caused a serious backlash. The international community, including normal Renamo backers such as the United States, told Afonso Dhlakama that the disruptions were unacceptable, and that in a democracy people had to be allowed to speak. Dhlakama then personally ordered the Renamo-UE bench to stop the disruptions.

But many in Renamo still argue that the disruptions were useful and effective, and also note that they were specifically targeted. One senior Renamo MP told the Bulletin that the disruption of the President's speech had been important to demonstrate that Renamo still did not accept the legitimacy of President Chissano, and the international community had told Chissano that the speech demonstrated that he had problems in the country. All diplomats who spoke to the Bulletin denied this, however.

Similarly, Renamo disrupted parliament to make clear that it objected to the proposal to remove the immunity from criminal prosecution of some of its MPs for what it saw as political acts.

Meanwhile, there continues to be a remarkable degree of cooperation in parliament, especially in standing and ad hoc commissions. Some knotty problems were resolved in inter-party negotiations. Revision of standing orders became a hot issue, but was suddenly resolved by the two parliamentary party leaders - with input from the party heads - which resulted in simple trades with both sides accepting some issues the other side wanted.

One issue in the standing orders proved surprising. Until now, the President's state of the nation speech has been debated by MPs. Renamo had proposed that there should be no debate on this speech, while the Frelimo parliamentary party wanted debate. But the Frelimo Political Committee met and decided that it agreed with Renamo, so in future there will be no debate on the president's speech.

 
Looking back:
BRIEF RECAP OF EVENTS

Following its rejection of the outcome of the December 1999 elections, Renamo largely boycotted parliament and the political process. Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama demanded to name governors in the six provinces where Renamo had a majority, and Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano pointedly did not name new governors (see box at page 2). There were secret but official talks between Transport Minister Tomás Salomão and then Renamo number two Raul Domingos, who had headed the Renamo parliamentary bench in the first parliament and had headed the Renamo negotiating team in Rome. These talks broke down in May.

With the failure of negotiations, the harder wing of Frelimo came to dominate, and moved to attack Renamo. In June a Chissano speech about the talks seemed aimed at splitting Renamo, and the party eventually expelled Domingos. In July Chissano named all 10 governors without consulting Renamo. In October police raided six Renamo houses in Beira, including one of Dhlakama's, taking away small quantities of arms which had initially been kept there under the 1992 Peace Accord; although technically illegal, they were never used and seemed no threat.

During the year Renamo threatened demonstrations and to set up shadow governments. Frelimo ignored the threats, and there were no demonstrations and no shadow governments.

But when Renamo announced demonstrations for 9 November, Frelimo reacted with unusually provocative statements, saying the demonstrations were illegal and calling on people not to participate. In effect, Frelimo elevated the importance of the demonstrations, which then took place in many cities.

Although technically illegal because Renamo did not inform the police in advance and because the demonstrations took place during the working day, in most places the police turned a blind eye and small marches and rallies went ahead peacefully.

But there were also clashes. In all, more than 40 people died in the worst violence since the end of the war. In several cities, the police over-reacted, firing into crowds or beating demonstrators.

But Montepuez was very different. An organised armed attack on the city took place; seven policemen as well as a number of attackers were killed. Renamo forces occupied and sacked official buildings, and stole weapons from the police station. When order was restored the police made mass arrests. Prisoners were pushed into small cells and left without food and adequate water. On 22 November 83 prisoners died of suffocation in a tiny cell.

On the same night, Carlos Cardoso, editor of Metical and Mozambique's most famous journalist, was assassinated in a gangster-style shooting.

The violence caused a real shock in Mozambique, leading to the formation of a civil society movement for peace, and eventually to the talks between Chissano and Dhlakama. But violence did not stop. In February, there was an attempt to assassinate deputy attorney general Albino Macamo, who had been investigating corruption within the justice system itself.

Attorney General Joaquim Madeira, appointed last year as the first step in a clean up, made a strikingly honest report to parliament in March, when he admitted that the legal system itself was sick and corrupt.

 
Already looking to 2003 local elections

Political parties and other forces are already preparing for local elections in two years, in sharp contrast to the first local elections in 1998 which were largely ignored.

Both Frelimo and Renamo are already publicly preparing. Three of the more significant small parties in the Renamo-UE coalition - Monamo, PCN and Fumo - have already made clear that they will stand in local elections separately from Renamo, either separately or as a coalition of three parties, and have approached donors for help with training.

There is a realisation that 2003 provides a rehearsal for the 2004 national elections and that as it is possible to stand in just a few cities; the demand on resources is not large, and available staff and money can be targeted in an attempt to make a good showing in a few places. Furthermore, citizens' lists are allowed to stand in local elections. Thus they can be seen as both a test of strength for possible coalition formation in 2004, and as an opportunity to learn party organising skills.

So far, there are only 33 municipalities, but it seems likely that more will be added to the list before the 2003 elections.

 
Is civil society the '3rd force'?

The international community has always wanted a so-called "third force" - a political party which is neither Frelimo nor Renamo. Several people have put themselves forward as leaders of alternatives, but they could never build a party.

But the growth of civil society in the past year, in response both to violence and to political polarisation, has led some to argue that this might become a political force. The Movement for Peace and Citizenship (MPC) was set up late last year to challenge crime and corruption and brings together 12 different organisations.

The most talked about new organisation is IPAD (Democratic Institute for Peace and Development, Instituto Democrático para a Paz e Desenvolvimento - the acronym is not linked to the name) set up by Raul Domingos (recently expelled from Renamo but still an MP), Salomão Moyana (editor of the independent weekly Savana), and Inácio Chire (former secretary general of the small party PCN).

IPAD is clearly a political base for Raul Domingos, and some donors seem disposed to support it. But Domingos argues that IPAD is "a different way to do politics." He accused both Frelimo and Renamo of "arrogance by always claiming to act in the name of the 'people' but having no knowledge of the people." The alternative is to strengthen the power of people through civil society. He argues that IPAD should be something like the political foundations in Europe and the United States.

Both IPAD and MPC (which includes IPAD as a member) are designed to promote broader political participation and to open issues up for debate in a way that the two main parties do not do.

Another newcomer is the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Development (CEDE, Centro de Estudos sobre Democracia e Desenvolvimento) headed by University Rector Brazão Mazula.

So far, these institutions have done very little and remain Maputo-based. But both IPAC and MPC have plans for national debate series.

IPAD and perhaps some other groups are looking to 2003 local elections, where groups which are not parties are allowed to stand. IPAD will try to promote citizens' groups to stand, and will try to bring together the citizens' groups already in city assemblies in Beira, Maputo and elsewhere.

If enough momentum is built up, then people from IPAD and other groups might try to form a party for 2004 national elections. The goal would be to obtain 10% of the seats - enough to play an active role in legislation or to force one of the big parties into a coalition.

IPAD plans information campaigns on the election law revision process, and plans to campaign in parliament to have the 5% threshold removed. This barrier requires a party to have 5% of the national vote, about 220,000 votes, before it can have a seat in parliament. It might be possible for small parties, backed by local citizens groups, to form a coalition to beat this barrier. But without the barrier, if a party ran a tightly focussed campaign in one city or one province and gained 20,000 votes, it would have a parliamentary seat.

 
Party transformation

Both parties are looking toward improvements in their party apparatus, after the close results in 1999. Both parties are already preparing for 2003 local elections. Both are using donor funds, particularly $3 million from an ongoing (and apparently unique) USAID programme. Under the US programme, the two main parties themselves decide how to use the money to draw on outside expertise.

Frelimo was shocked that the result was much closer than its militants in the provinces predicted, and it has moved fastest toward modernisation. Some US money has been used, for example, to gain advice on more sophisticated polling methods that can be used not just to predict voting patterns, but also on how to use public opinion to revise policy and gain votes away from the opposition. One member of the Frelimo old guard commented: "Frelimo must change to survive; to not change is suicide." A deep debate is expected at the May Central Committee meeting.

Renamo has been training youth and women's movements, is trying to create a larger cadre on the ground, and has used foreign support to help it build the Renamo-UE coalition. But there is a huge frustration within the donor community, and even within the Renamo-UE coalition, at the failure of Renamo to transform itself from a very tightly controlled and centralised movement into a political party. Afonso Dhlakama continues to rule the party very tightly and will not accept any opposition; after the expulsion last year of the former number two Raul Domingos, Dhlakama told donors that he had felt undermined by Domingos.

Donors complain that Dhlakama refuses to send on training courses higher level people who might benefit, and instead sends lower level people who are effectively given a few days away at donor expense as a reward for loyalty, and who fall asleep in meetings. Observers argue that the lack of a strong layer of people below the top means a lack of political thinkers and means Renamo fails to capitalise on political opportunities.

Renamo has also had visits from opposition parties in neighbouring countries, who have argued that Renamo should take a more active and constructive role as an opposition, and even present alternative programmes, but this advice has been rejected.

The failure of Renamo to hold a Congress continues to provoke donor discontent; one important European agency has taken the money it had reserved to support the Renamo congress and is giving it to Raul Domingos' new group, IPAD.

Some diplomats feel that Dhlakama wants to give his supporters rewards instead of democracy, and that an important part of the demands for governorships is the patronage power of governors.